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We provide simple mechanisms to implement the ecient allocation of
pollution, rst assuming complete information across rms and then al-
lowing for incomplete information. Both mechanisms operate by inducing
rms to monitor one another, using rms' reports to determine pollution
allotments and transfers. The complete information mechanism deter-
mines a rm's transfer according to a linear pollution price, set by other
rms. Both mechanisms can be modied to be budget-balanced, in and
out of equilibrium. The complete information mechanism implements the
ecient allocation even when rms are allowed to use mixed strategies.
Under a \single-crossing" condition, the same holds for the incomplete
information mechanism.1 Introduction
Markets to allocate pollution rights play an important role in current eorts to control
pollution eciently | the Environmental Protection Agency has allowed rms to
trade pollution permits since 1977 | and this role is likely to grow as pollution
abatement eorts intensify. It is clear that a solution to the pollution control problem
must involve decentralization of some sort: ecient pollution emissions depend on
revenue and cost characteristics of rms, which are typically unknown to regulatory
authorities. And with decentralization there arises the possibility of strategic behavior
on the part of rms. The extensive literature on the theory of implementation is
concerned with precisely this problem, but the mechanisms proposed there, while
general in scope, are typically quite complex. In this paper, we construct simple
mechanisms to solve the specic problem of eciently allocating pollution emissions
among a xed set of rms, assuming the regulatory authority can observe pollution
emissions and knows the social cost of pollution. The regulator need not know the
characteristics of the rms. We initially assume that rms have complete information
about each other's characteristics, and we then relax that assumption to allow for
incomplete information.
In much of the existing pollution control literature, it is assumed that the regula-
tor knows the ecient level of total pollution | or at least an appropriate \target"
level | and the problem is only to allocate that given quantity of pollution permits
among rms. As discussed by Dale (1968), a competitive market for pollution permits
is well-suited for this task: in equilibrium, rms equate the marginal benet of pollu-
tion to a common price and, therefore, marginal benets are equated across rms. If
the impact of pollution is independent of its source, an ecient allocation of pollution
permits is achieved. Kwerel (1977) shows how a combination of licensing and euent
charges can induce rms to reveal their technological characteristics truthfully, allow-
ing the regulator to determine the ecient level of total pollution, but his result relies
on price-taking behavior in the market for permits, an untenable assumption if, as
Hahn (1984) supposes, some rms have market power. Lewis and Sappington (1995)
generalize the simplest problem by allowing rms to have incomplete information but
still assume the regulator knows the socially optimal level of pollution.1
Our mechanisms endogenously produce the ecient level of total pollution and
allocates this total eciently, while recognizing the strategic incentives of rms to
exercise market power, i.e., to in
uence the prices they pay for pollution emissions.
To address this problem, the complete information mechanism replicates the most
important feature of competitive markets: each rm purchases a quantity of pollution
1Xepapdeas (1991), Kritikos (1993), and Herriges, Govidasamy, and Shogren (1994) consider the
problem of abatement monitoring in an imperfect information environment with budget{balancing.
However, they also assume that the regulator knows the optimal pollution level.
1at a price that is independent of the rm's actions. In contrast to the above work,
we allow the social impact of pollution to depend on the rm that produces it,2 so
eciency cannot always be achieved with a uniform price. Nonetheless, by designing
incentives for the rms to monitor each other, each rm's price is set appropriately and
the allocation of pollution is determined eciently in the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the mechanism. The incomplete information mechanism still induces
the rms to monitor each other, but, because rms may have insucient information
to set prices accurately, pollution emissions are no longer allocated according to a
system of linear prices.
The complete information mechanism not only produces the ecient allocation
of pollution as an equilibrium outcome, but | since the equilibrium is unique | it
ensures that no other allocations can arise as a result of equilibrium behavior. Thus,
we implement the ecient allocation in Nash equilibrium using a mechanism that is
especially simple compared to those in the implementation literature.3 Problematic
constructions, such as integer games, modulo games, and other forms of \unwinnable
competition," are not used. Firms simply select quantities of pollution, used to set
prices, and are charged accordingly. The outcome function of the mechanism is con-
tinuous, and it is therefore robust to small mistakes in the strategic choices of rms.
As long as the regulator can place an upper bound on the ecient level of total pollu-
tion (which we will assume), the strategies of rms can also be restricted to compact
sets. Duggan and Roberts (1998) show that, under these conditions, the equilibrium
outcomes of the mechanism are robust to \small" departures from the complete infor-
mation assumption. We show that the mechanism is easily adapted to handle mixed
strategies and to produce a balanced budget, both in and out of equilibrium. More-
over, we can extend the mechanism to allow for negative externalities across rms as
the result of pollution emissions.
Though our analysis takes place in the context of rms and pollution emissions, it
applies equally well to the general problem of implementing social welfare optima in
quasi-linear environments. Thus, our complete information mechanism is related to
the \Nash-ecient" mechanisms surveyed by Groves (1979), and our extension to the
case of negative externalities is reminiscent of Hurwicz's (1979) and Walker's (1981)
mechanisms for implementing Lindahl equilibria in public good economies. Moore
and Repullo (1988) and Varian (1994) propose simple multi-stage mechanisms and,
in contrast to other work cited here, use the renement of subgame perfect equilibrium
to implement ecient outcomes.4 While our approach is distinguished by the specic
2The assumption of \anonymous" pollution is unrealistic, for example, if rms are geographically
distinct and pollution is localized: the social cost of a medium amount of pollution, spread very
thinly, may be insignicant; when concentrated at just one locality, however, it may be quite costly.
3See Maskin (1977) and Moore and Repullo (1990) for general analyses of Nash implementation.
4Eyckmans (1997) adapts Varian's mechanism to implement a proportional solution to a complete
2way in which announcements determine prices, our approach also diers from that
taken in these papers by explicitly allowing the presence of social externalities (here,
the cost of pollution) due to the agents' actions.
The incomplete information mechanism implements the ecient allocation of pol-
lution in Bayesian equilibrium. That this is possible follows from the general analysis
of Matsushima (1993), who shows that Bayesian monotonicity, a critical condition for
implementation,5 is automatically satised in quasi-linear environments satisfying a
condition called \No Consistent Deceptions." This condition restricts the distribu-
tion of rms' characteristics and is somewhat weaker than the condition employed in
this paper. While Matsushima proves the possibility of implementation, he does not
provide a simple mechanism suitable for the task. As before, our mechanism gives
rms incentives to monitor each other, but, because information is incomplete, one
rm can no longer give a point prediction of another's pollution emissions | using
a method of belief revelation in Duggan (1998), we ask each rm to report its beliefs
about its neighbor. The mechanism can be adapted to achieve budget-balance, both
in and out of equilibrium, and, if a \single-crossing" property is imposed, eciency
is maintained even if the rms can use mixed strategies.
Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980) consider the problem of ecient pollu-
tion control, allowing, as we do, for dierential impact of pollution and for incom-
plete information. Their mechanism, a simple adaptation of the mechanism of Groves
(1973), Clarke (1971), and Vickrey (1960), has the advantage that rms have dom-
inant strategies leading to ecient pollution. It is well known, however, that the
Groves-Clarke-Vickrey (GCV) mechanisms are not generally budget-balanced, and
the Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin mechanism inherits that 
aw. Our incomplete in-
formation mechanism uses GCV transfers, but only o the equilibrium path. Thus,
when there are at least three rms, it is a simple matter to balance the budget in
equilibrium. Modifying the mechanism somewhat further, we achieve budget-balance
out of equilibrium as well.
Cr emer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) consider a general
mechanism design problem in which agents have incomplete information and oer a
mechanism that, under a weak informational condition, generates the optimal allo-
cation as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome and extracts all surplus from the agents.
Their restriction on the distribution of agents' types neither implies nor is implied by
the condition we impose. Indeed, the objective of these papers is essentially dierent
than ours: they seek to design a mechanism supporting a particular sort of allocation
(surplus-extracting) as an equilibrium, but, as noted by Cr emer and McLean, their
information pollution abatement problem. This solution requires that individuals bear abatement
costs in proportion to their willingness to pay for abatement.
5See Jackson (1991) for a general analysis of Bayesian implementation.
3mechanism may have multiple equilibria, some of them inecient. Our objective, in
contrast, is to design a mechanism with an ecient and unique equilibrium, avoiding
the problem of selecting from multiple equilibria. Less critically, we are concerned
with achieving budget-balance, while these papers achieve a net 
ow of transfers,
equal to the total surplus of the agents, to the planner.
In Section 2, we describe our complete information model; we present our rst
mechanism and show that its unique Nash equilibrium yields the socially optimal
allocation of pollution; and we discuss possible extensions of our model, some men-
tioned above. For another example, while we focus on the problem of negative social
externalities in this paper, our mechanism works equally well in the \dual" problem of
positive social externalities, where rms produce a social good as a byproduct of their
actions. In Section 3, we describe the incomplete information model and mechanism;
we show that it uniquely implements the ecient level of pollution; and we extend
our results to account for mixed strategies and budget-balancing.
We close this section by mentioning several issues that, although beyond the
scope of this work, merit future consideration. First, while we do not assume that
the regulator knows the cost and revenue characteristics of rms, we do assume the
regulator observes the pollution outputs of each rm | but in many situations only
the aggregate level of pollution may be observed and may not be easily attributed
to the rms separately. Thus, we have focused on one important type of asymmetric
information in regulatory problems (adverse selection) while abstracting away from
another (moral hazard). Second, we have not considered the issue of collusion, which
would be a particularly relevant issue when the number of rms is small and rms
interact over long time horizons. One approach to this issue would be to design
mechanisms that implement the ecient allocation of pollution not only in Nash
equilibrium but also in strong Nash equilibrium, which captures the incentives of
coalitions to engage in cooperative behavior.6 Last, as just hinted, pollution control is
a dynamic problem, and the analysis of ecient pollution control should be extended
to cover situations in which output/pollution decisions are made repeatedly over time.
2 Complete Information
2.1 The Model
We consider n  2 rms, indexed by i. Denote i's level of pollution (or equivalently i's
quantity of pollution permits) by Qi. The monetary benet that i receives from pro-
ducing Qi units of pollution is denoted Bi(Qi), and C(Q1;:::;Qn) is the social cost,
measured in monetary terms, imposed on society by the rms' pollution. We assume
6See Maskin (1979) for a general analysis of implementation in strong Nash equilibrium.
4that each Bi() is concave and dierentiable, that C() is continuously dierentiable,7
and that [
Pn
i=1 Bi(Qi)]   C(Q1;:::;Qn) is strictly concave. The benet and cost
functions are common knowledge among the rms, while the regulator is assumed to
know only the form of the cost function.
The regulator's problem is to implement the socially optimal allocation of pollu-
tion, i.e., the solution to
maxQ1;:::;Qn [n
i=1Bi(Qi)]   C(Q1;:::;Qn)
s.t. Q1  0;:::;Qn  0:
We assume this problem has a solution, which, by strict concavity, must be unique.
Denote it (Q
1;:::;Q
n). We impose the appropriate Inada-type conditions on C() and
each Bi() to ensure an interior solution,8 so that the social optimum is characterized














for all i. Lastly, we assume the regulator knows some bound K such that Q
i < K for
all i.
Because social costs may depend dierentially on the emissions of dierent rms,
the ecient allocation cannot generally be obtained by xing a price common to all




for each rm i, but this requires knowledge of the social optimum itself. And this
in turn requires a familiarity with the rms' benet functions that is unlikely to be
found in practice. In the next subsection, we construct a simple mechanism that
implements the ecient allocation of pollution, without presuming such familiarity
on the part of the regulator.
2.2 The Mechanism
The mechanism is dened as follows. Firm i purchases a quantity ^ Qi 2 [0;K] for
itself and reports a quantity Qi 1 2 [0;K] for its \neighbor," rm i   1, where we




( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn) + jQi 1   ^ Qi 1j:




@Qi(Q1;:::;Qn)] = 1, for all Q1;:::;Qn.
5Thus, rm i faces the price @C
@Qi( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn), which is independent
of its own reports. The second term in the rm's payment is a penalty for misrepre-
senting the demand of its neighbor.
Proposition 1. The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the above mechanism is
given by (Qi 1; ^ Qi) = (Q
i 1;Q




It is straightforward to verify, using concavity of each Bi(), that the above speci-
cation of strategies is indeed a Nash equilibrium. To verify that it is unique, consider
an arbitrary pure strategy equilibrium, and note that, because rm i cannot aect






( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn):
By our assumptions on Bi(), ^ Qi > 0 and
dBi
dQi
( ^ Qi) 
@C
@Qi
( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1 :::; ^ Qn)
are satised. Assume for now that the rst order condition holds with equality for




( ^ Qi) =
@C
@Qi
( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1; ^ Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn)
for all i, which is satised only at the social optimum.








this is equivalent to @W
@Qi( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qn) 6= 0 and implies that @W
@Qi( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qn) > 0 and
^ Qi = K > Q
i. Thus, rW( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qn) > 0 and









n)   W( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qn);
where the weak inequality follows from concavity of W() and Sundaram's (1996)
Theorem 7.9. But then W( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qn) > W(Q
1;:::;Q
n), a contradiction.
9If the rms were not restricted to the compact set [0;K], equality would obviously obtain. Drop-
ping that restriction would simplify the proof but would result in a less \well-behaved" mechanism.
62.3 Extensions
The model of Section 2.1 and the result of Section 2.2 can be extended in several
interesting ways.
Mixed Strategies. Proposition 1 restricts rms to pure strategies, but the result
can be extended if we assume each Bi() is strictly concave. In this case, consider an
arbitrary mixed strategy equilibrium. Then @C
@Qi is a random variable, and rm i's







( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn)
#
:
Since Bi() is strictly concave, this problem has a unique solution, say ^ Qi. Thus, i's
mixed strategy is to play ^ Qi with probability one. A similar observation holds true
for the other rms, so the argument of Section 2.2 applies.
Budget-balancing. When n  3, the mechanism is easily modied to achieve





( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 1;Qi;Qi+1; ^ Qi+2;:::; ^ Qn);
where we use Qi here instead of ^ Qi and we drop the term jQi   ^ Qij, so rm i cannot
aect this adjustment. Since Qi = ^ Qi and Qi+1 = ^ Qi+1 in equilibrium, this amount
equals rm i + 1's equilibrium payment, yielding a balanced budget.
To balance the budget out of equilibrium as well, we modify the original mecha-
nism somewhat. In addition to purchasing quantity ^ Qi, rm i reports quantities Qi 1





( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 2;Qi 1;Qi; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn) + jQi 1   ^ Qi 1j + jQi 1   ^ Qi 2j:
As with the original mechanism, rm i's reports of Qi 1 and Qi 2 will match ^ Qi 1
and ^ Qi 2 in equilibrium. The dierence that allows us to fully balance the budget
is that now the rst part of the base payment is independent of rm i   1's reports.




( ^ Q1;:::; ^ Qi 2;Qi;Qi+1; ^ Qi+1;:::; ^ Qn) + jQi+1   ^ Qi+1j + jQi 1   ^ Qi 1j;
which is independent of rm i's reports. The rst term above is exactly the rst term
in rm i+1's base payment, whereas the second and third terms above are the second
term in rm i + 2's base payment and the third term in rm i + 1's base payment.
7Negative Externalities Across Firms. We have assumed each rm's benet from
polluting is independent of the levels of pollution of other rms. A more general model
would allow for externalities: rms may experience either market externalities (as
when high levels of pollution by other rms may re
ect high levels of production and
a competitive output market) or production externalities as pollution levels rise. We
now allow for externalities among the rms, using Bi(Q1;:::;Qn) to denote the benet
of rm i corresponding to pollution quantities Q1;:::;Qn. We assume externalities
are negative, i.e.,
@Bi
@Qj < 0 for i 6= j, and we impose the appropriate Inada-type
conditions to guarantee interior solutions. The regulator's problem is dened as
before, with unique solution (Q
1;:::;Q


















We modify the mechanism as follows. We have each rm i purchase a vector
^ Qi = ( ^ Qi
1;:::; ^ Qi
n) of pollution quantities, one quantity for each rm,10 where ^ Qi
j is
interpreted as an amount added to rm j's pollution by rm i. Note that Qi
i is the
amount of rm i's pollution purchased by itself. If ^ Qi
j < 0, which we allow, then rm
j's outputs are decreased by   ^ Qi






n ), where Q
i 1
j represents the increment to rm j's pollution







of pollution purchased for it, and is charged for its own purchases according to a
vector of prices. Once again, it is important that rm i not be able to in
uence its









which is the total amount of rm k's pollution with rm i's increment replaced by
Q
i












10If externalities among rms are limited, we can simplify the mechanism by having rm i only
purchase pollution quantities for rms imposing externalities on i.
8j = 1;:::;n, for other rms' pollution outputs. Note that the latter prices are
negative, so rm i pays for the reduction of other rms' pollution outputs and is
compensated for increases in their pollution levels. In addition, i pays the penalty
jjQ
i 1   ^ Qi 1jj for misrepresenting its neighbor's pollution purchases.
The argument that this mechanism implements the socially optimal allocation of
pollution is similar to our earlier one. Ignoring corner solutions, every equilibrium















for all i and all j 6= i. Because of the strict incentive for each rm i to report its
neighbor's purchases accurately, we also have Q = Q in equilibrium. Making this
substitution and summing up the rms' rst order conditions with respect to each
Qj, we see that the rst order conditions for the socially optimal allocation are met.
Positive Social Externalities. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we analyzed the problem
of negative social externalities, of which pollution is a special case, but our mecha-
nism also implements solutions to problems of positive social externalities. We now
interpret Qi as an activity of rm i that costs Ci(Qi), where Ci() is dierentiable
and convex, and the social benet of activity is B(Q1;:::;Qn), where B() is also
dierentiable. We now assume that B(Q1;:::;Qn)  
Pn
i=1 Ci(Qi) is strictly concave
and that the social optimization problem has an interior solution. The mechanism
is unchanged, except that payments from rms become payments to rms. For an
example of positive social externalities, suppose that Qi measures the attractiveness
of storefronts in a downtown area, Ci(Qi) is the cost to rm i of maintaining a store-
front of quality Qi, and B(Q1;:::;Qn) is the corresponding social benet. Of course,
the agents under consideration need not be rms. They may be workers in a factory,
where Qi denotes i's contribution of eort, Ci(Qi) a cost of eort, and B(Q1;:::;Qn)
the monetary worth of output, as a function of the vector of eorts expended by
workers.
Abatement. We have assumed that rm i may emit pollution in quantities not
exceeding ^ Qi, the quantity of pollution purchased by i. In some situations, it would
be equally reasonable to let rm i produce any amount ~ Qi of pollution, so long as it
cleans up the quantity ~ Qi   ^ Qi of pollution not paid for. Letting C
i (Qi) denote i's














ects the monetary benet to rm i of Q0
i pollution permits. Since pollution
in excess of Q0
i is cleaned up, it need not be included in the regulator's calculation of
social cost, so the maximization problem of Section 2.1 (with B
i substituted for Bi)
is still the appropriate one. If B
i () is dierentiable and concave, the remainder of
our analysis carries over without change.
3 Incomplete Information
3.1 The Model
Each rm i now has a nite set i of possible characteristics, or \types," denoted i,
0
i, etc., representing the protability of pollution to rm i. Let  = i2Ni be the
set of characteristic proles  = (1;:::;n), and let p denote the joint distribution
of the rms' characteristics. For simplicity, we assume p() > 0 for each prole .
In this section, we can allow rm i's benet to depend on the pollution levels of all
rms: thus, Bi(Q1;:::;Qn;i) denotes the prot of rm i when the pollution outputs
of the rms are Q1;:::;Qn and i's characteristic is i. The social cost function
is C(Q1;:::;Qn), as before. We assume that each rm's characteristic is private
information, and that the distribution of characteristics, the benet functions, and
the social cost function are common knowledge among the rms. The regulator is
assumed to know the distribution, the benet functions, and the cost function, but
not the characteristics of the rms. We assume that the regulator's problem,
maxQ1;:::;Qn [
Pn
i=1 Bi(Q1;:::;Qn;i)]   C(Q1;:::;Qn)
s.t. Q1  0;:::;Qn  0;
has a unique solution, denoted Q() = (Q
1();:::;Q
n()), for every prole  of
characteristics. Further, we assume the solution is sensitive to the characteristics of
the agents: i 6= 0
i implies Q(i; i) 6= Q(0
i; i) for all  i. Neither concavity nor
dierentiability are required in this section.
Once we allow for incomplete information, we must address the issue of incentive
compatibility.11 That is, along with an allocation of pollution, we must specify a
vector of payments from the rms for every prole of characteristics such that truth-
ful reporting of characteristics is a Bayesian equilibrium (see Harsanyi (1967-68)).
To state this condition formally, we let ti() denote the payment from rm i when
characteristic prole  is realized; we let t() = (t1();:::;tn()) be the prole of
payments; and we let pi( i) denote the probability that the characteristic prole
11Jackson (1991) shows that incentive compatibility is a necessary condition for Bayesian im-
plementation. It is automatically satised in complete information environments with quasi-linear
preferences, as in Section 2.
10 i = (1;:::;i 1;i+1;:::;n) is realized, conditional on i. Then incentive compat-















In words, if every other rm reports is characteristics truthfully, no type of rm i has
an incentive to misreport its type. D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) establish
the existence of a function t() such that (Q;t) is incentive compatible. Moreover,
when the characteristics of the rms are independently distributed, they show that
t can be constructed to be budget-balanced:
Pn
i=1 t
i() = 0 for all . We will
assume only that (Q;t) is incentive compatible for now, though later we entertain
the possibility of balanced transfers.
Our main result on incomplete information makes use of the following technical
restriction on the distribution of the rms' characteristics | it should be apparent
that it holds generically (i.e., for an open, dense set of distributions on characteristic
proles). Below, let qi denote the distribution of i 1 conditional on i, i.e., qi is the
marginal of pi on rm i   1's characteristic.
() For all i, all i, and all 0
i, if A and B are distinct subsets of i 1, then qi(A) 6=
q0
i(B).
The condition can be broken into two parts. First, for a given characteristic i of
rm i, no two distinct sets of i   1's characteristics are realized with exactly the
same conditional probability. Second, distinct types of rm i never assign identical
probabilities to distinct sets of i   1's types. Though () holds generically, it is
potentially restrictive: the rst part of the condition rules out uniformly distributed
characteristics; the second part rules out complete information.12 Later, we impose
a \single-crossing" property on the rms' benet functions that allows us to weaken
().
The mechanism of the next section makes use of a pairwise monitoring scheme
similar to that of the previous section. Now, however, we ask rms to report their
characteristics directly rather than pollution quantities. Because rm i has incomplete
information about i 1, we cannot ask rm i to report i 1's type. Instead, we ask rm
i to report the distribution of i 1's reported types. Assuming type i of rm i reveals
the actual distribution conditional on i, an implication of condition () is that any
deception by i 1 will be revealed to the regulator in this distribution. For example,
12Complete information models, formulated in Bayesian terms, give rms identical sets of types
jointly distributed along diagonal of .
11suppose there two rms with sets of characteristics 1 = f0
1;00
1g and 2 = f0
2;00
2g
















If rm 1 reports deceptively, say type 0
1 reporting 00
1 and visa versa, consider the
distributions of 1's reports conditional on rm 2's types. Conditional on type 0
2, rm
2 expects 1 to report 0
1 with probability 1/3 and 00
1 with probability 2/3. If rm
2 reports this accurately, the regulator can infer that rm 1 is acting deceptively:
under truthtelling, this distribution cannot arise as a conditional distribution of rm
1's reports, regardless of rm 2's type. In this manner, condition () allows the
regulator to identify any deceptions using conditional distributions of reports. In the
next section, we describe a payment scheme that gives the rms' strict incentives to
reveal these conditional distributions accurately.
3.2 The Mechanism
The mechanism is dened as follows. Each rm i reports a type ^ i 2 i and a prob-
ability distribution ^ qi on i 1, which is to be interpreted as the distribution of the
characteristics reported by i   1. Pollution quantities are allocated as though the
reported types of the rms are true: rm i is allocated Q
i(^ ). Firm i's reported dis-
tribution is used in determining its own payment as well as rm i 1's. In determining
rm i   1's payment, the reported distribution ^ qi is compared to the distributions in
the set fqi j i 2 ig, the set of possible conditional distributions (depending on the
realization of i's type) of rm i   1's reports when i   1 is reporting truthfully. By
reporting ^ qi not in this set, rm i indicates a deception by i 1. If ^ qi 2 fqi j i 2 ig,










aligning rm i   1's incentives with those of the regulator in the manner of the
mechanism of Groves (1973), Clarke (1971), and Vickrey (1960). We minimize their
budget-balancing problem by employing their mechanism for out-of-equilibrium pay-
ments only.
12To eectively use rm i's reported ^ qi to monitor rm i   1, rm i's reported
distribution must also aect its own payment: we augment the above transfer to elicit
truthful belief revelation as in Duggan (1998). Given ^ qi and reported characteristic
^ i 1, rm i pays
 








where  > 0 is arbitrary. We show below that this payment makes it a strict best
response for every type i to submit the actual conditional distribution of rm i 1's
reported types, regardless of i 1's reporting strategy. Because we augment the rms'
payments by negative amounts, the belief revelation part of the mechanism creates a
net 
ow of transfers to the regulator, made arbitrarily small by choice of . We show
below that, when there are at least three rms, payments can be modied to achieve
full budget-balancing.
Proposition 2. The unique pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium of the above mech-
anism is given by (^ i; ^ qi) = (i;qi) for all i and all i, and this yields the socially
optimal allocation Q() of pollution for all .
We rst argue that, in equilibrium, rm i correctly reports the distribution of rm
i   1's reported characteristics, regardless of i   1's reporting strategy. Let ^ i 1()
denote rm i   1's (possibly deceptive) reporting rule, i.e., type i 1 of rm i   1
reports ^ i 1(i 1). Let ri denote the distribution of i   1's reported characteristics
conditional on i. That is,
ri(
0
i 1) = qi(fi 1 2 i 1 j ^ i 1(i 1) = 
0
i 1g):
Given ri and reported distribution ^ qi for rm i, i's expected belief revelation payment
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which follows because, for all 0
i 1, ^ qi(0
i 1)2 appears on the lefthand side once for each
i 1 6= 0









13is ri(i 1). Thus, type i of rm i has a strict best response to report the actual
conditional probability distribution of ^ i 1 for any reporting rule used by rm i   1.
In particular, if rm i   1 is reporting truthfully, type i of rm i has a strict best
response to report qi.
Now consider the strategy prole given in Proposition 2, which has each rm re-
porting its type truthfully and, conditional on its type, the true marginal distribution
on its neighbor's type. We have shown that it is a best response for rm i to report
the actual conditional distribution of rm i 1's reported types, which in this case is
just qi. Thus, the rms' reported distributions minimize belief revelation payments
to the regulator. Since all rms, including rm i + 1, are reporting true marginal
distributions, rm i's payment is given by t
i() for all  and the additional payment
to elicit beliefs. Then, since all other rms report their characteristics truthfully, the
incentive compatibility of (Q;t) ensures that it is a best response for every type i
of rm i to report i. Therefore, the strategy prole described in Proposition 2 is a
Bayesian equilibrium.
To verify that it is the unique equilibrium, consider a pure strategy equilibrium
where some rm i uses a deceptive reporting rule: ^ i(0
i) 6= 0
i for some 0
i. We have
noted that every type ~ i+1 of rm i + 1 has a unique best response to report the
actual conditional distribution r~ i+1 of i's reported characteristics. We argue that
r~ i+1 = 2 fqi+1 j i+1 2 i+1g. Let A = f0
ig and B = fi j ^ i(i) = 0
ig, and
note that, because type 0
i is reporting falsely, A 6= B. Then, by condition (),
qi+1(A) 6= q~ i+1(B) for all i+1. Equivalently, qi+1(0
i) 6= r~ i+1(0
i) for all i+1, as
claimed.

















where ^ () = (^ 1(1);:::; ^ n(n)) is the vector of reported characteristics, less the


















less the expected belief revelation payment, which is independent of i's reported type.
We analyze this expression term-by-term. Fix any  i, let ^  i = ^  i( i), and rewrite
the  i term of the expression as
2
4Bi(Q






(^ i; ^  i); ^ j)
3
5   C(Q
(^ i; ^  i))
3
5pi( i):
14By assumption, the unique maximum of Bi(;i)+
hP
j6=i Bj(; ^ j)
i
 C() is Q(i; ^  i),
which type i can obtain by reporting i. Moreover, since we have assumed that any
false report would lead to a dierent pollution allocation, reporting i is the unique
maximizer. Since this is true for the term corresponding to every  i, rm i's expected
payo, conditional on i, is uniquely maximized by reporting the truth. But we began
with the assumption that some type of rm i was reporting falsely in equilibrium, a
contradiction.
Therefore, in any Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism, every type of every rm
must be reporting truthfully. The belief revelation payment ensures that every type
i of rm i reports the actual conditional distribution, qi, of rm i   1's reports.
That is, (^ i; ^ qi) = (i;qi) for all i and all i.
3.3 Extensions
As before, our incomplete information results can be extended in a number of ways.
Non-generic Distributions of Characteristics. The arguments above depend criti-
cally on condition (). The condition implies that deceptions by rm i are necessarily
re
ected in the distribution of its reported characteristic, allowing the regulator to de-
tect deceptions by rm i using rm i+1's reported ^ qi+1. We have mentioned that the
condition is generically satised but rules out some distributions of interest. We can
relax condition () by imposing the following single-crossing property on the benet
functions of the rms: let each rm i's characteristics be ordered 1
i < 2
i <  < 
ki
i ,











for all (Q1;:::;Qn). In words, rm i's higher types have higher marginal values of
pollution. Furthermore, we require the optimal allocation of pollution to a rm to be
monotonic in the rm's characteristic: Q
i(h
i ; i)  Q
i(
h+1
i ; i) for all  i. With
these assumptions, we can drop the rst part of condition (), leaving
() For all i, all i, and all 0
i 6= i, if A and B are distinct subsets of i 1, then
qi(A) 6= q0
i(B).
Because the condition now applies only across distinct i and 0
i, the distribution qi
is restricted only in its relation to other conditional distributions. It could now be,
for example, that qi is uniform for some i.
Our uniqueness argument must now be modied. If qi is uniform, some deceptions
by rm i   1 (such as those where two types switch reports) will not be re
ected in
the distribution of i   1's reported types conditional on i. We argue, however, that
such deceptions cannot be best responses for rm i   1. To illustrate, suppose that
two types, i 1 < 0
i 1, are switching reports. If it is a best response for type i 1 to
15report 0
i 1, thereby increasing its allotment of pollution, it cannot be a best response
for type 0
i 1, which values this increment of pollution more, to report i 1. Generally,
if it is desirable for one type i 1 to report falsely in one direction (say, higher), then
it cannot be a best response for higher types to report i 1 or lower. Therefore,
any deception that could be a best response for i   1 will be re
ected in the rm's
distribution of reported characteristics, and our above analysis applies.
Mixed Strategies. Allowing rm i   1 to use mixed reporting strategies raises the
possibility of a mixed deception that is not re
ected in the conditional distributions
of i   1's reported characteristics. In 2  2 example in the previous subsection,
suppose that type 00
1 reports 0
1 with probability one, and that type 0
1 reports the
truth with probability 1/2 and 00
1 with probability 1/2. Consider the distribution of
rm 1's reports conditional on type 0
2 of rm 2: rm 2 expects rm 1 to report 0
1
with probability 2/3 and 00
1 with probability 1/3. In contrast to the pure strategy
case, the conditional distribution induced by this mixed deception is consistent with
truthtelling.
Such examples of consistent mixed deceptions require an exact balancing of re-
porting probabilities: if some type i reports deceptively with positive probability,
other types must report i to just oset that probability. Ordering the characteristics
of the rms and imposing the single-crossing property dened above, our previous
arguments show that this balancing cannot be a best response for all of a rm's
types, and therefore cannot occur in equilibrium. Thus, under the single-crossing
assumption, our arguments can be extended to allow rms to use mixed strategies.
Budget-balancing. When n  3, the mechanism is easily modied to achieve
budget-balancing in equilibrium, assuming t is balanced. We simply make rm
i + 2's belief revelation payment a transfer to rm i. That is, we deduct the amount
 








depending on the reports of i + 1 and i + 2, from rm i's payment to the regulator.
Because the added payment does not depend on the reports of rm i, the above
analysis is not aected.
By further modifying the mechanism, we can achieve budget-balance out of equi-
librium as well. We continue to have each rm i report ^ i and ^ qi, with belief revelation
payments specied as above. If exactly one rm, say i, reports ^ qi inconsistent with










16each rm j 6= i 1 pays t
j(^ ); and, letting l be the highest indexed rm other than i






(^ ); ^ j)
3
5   C(Q
(^ ))   t

i 1(^ );
balancing the budget. If more than one rm reports a distribution inconsistent with
truth-telling by its neighbor, let i and k be the lowest indexed such rms; then rm









rm k   1's payment is dened similarly, with \k   1" replacing \i   1"; each rm j
other than i   1 and k   1 pays t
j(^ ); and, letting l denote the highest indexed rm














(^ ); ^ j)
3
5   2C(Q
(^ ))   t

i 1(^ )   t

k 1(^ );
balancing the budget. The strategy prole of Proposition 2 is still clearly an equilib-
rium: if, for example, some type i of rm i deviates by reporting ^ qi 6= qi, its own
payments to the regulator are unchanged.
To see that there are no other equilibria, consider any equilibrium strategy prole.
We rst claim that rm 1 reports the actual distribution of rm n's reported char-
acteristics. We have shown that rm 1's expected belief revelation payment to the
regulator, conditional on each type, is minimized by doing so, but we must verify that
doing so will not aect the remainder of rm 1's payment. Consider any realization
of the other rms' types and any reports by the other rms. If no other rms report
inconsistencies, then rm 1 pays t
1(^ ) regardless of its reported distribution. If some
other rm, say i, reports a distribution inconsistent with truth-telling by its neighbor,
then either i 1 = 1, or rm 1 is used to balance the budget, or neither holds. In the
rst case, rm 1 receives the Groves-Clarke-Vickrey transfer regardless of its reported
distribution. The second case can only occur when n = 3, rm 2 does not report
an inconsistency with truth-telling on the part of rm 1, and rm 3 does report an
inconsistency on the part of rm 2. In that case, rm 1 balances the budget regardless
of its reported distribution. If neither holds, then rm 1 receives t
1(^ ) regardless of
its reported distribution. Thus, the claim is proved.
We next claim that rm n reports its characteristic truthfully. If not, we have
just established that each type of rm 1 will report a distribution for n inconsistent
with truth-telling. Then, by construction, rm n receives the Groves-Clarke-Vickrey
transfer with probability one and, as explained in Section 3.2, rm n has a strict in-
centive to report its characteristic truthfully, a contradiction. Furthermore, it follows
that each type of rm 1 reports a distribution for n consistent with truth-telling.
17A similar argument establishes that rm 2 accurately reports the distribution of
rm 1's reported characteristic. The only point that may require elaboration is when
some other rm, i, reports an inconsistency and rm 2 is used to balance the budget.
Since rm 1 does not report an inconsistency, this case can only occur when n = 4,
rm 3 does not report an inconsistency on the part of rm 2, and rm 4 does report an
inconsistency on the part of rm 3. In that case, rm 2 balances the budget regardless
of its reported distribution. Thus, rm 2 accurately reports the distribution of rm
1's reported characteristic, and it follows as above that rm 1 must report its own
characteristic truthfully and that each type of rm 2 reports a distribution for 1
consistent with truth-telling. Arranging these arguments in the form of an induction
proof (omitted), we see that the same is true for all rms and, consequently, that the
equilibrium is exactly that of Proposition 2.
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